Analysis

The Fall of Empires

Record US debt, property and demography in China, a war economy in Russia, stalled growth in Europe: the causes, mechanisms, risks and solutions, explained step by step with 13 charts and diagrams.

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In the 16th century, Philip II's Spain was the world's leading power. It had the silver of the Americas, the best infantry in Europe and an empire "on which the sun never sets". Yet it defaulted on its debts several times during that one reign. Empires rarely fall because an enemy topples them. They fall mostly because they can no longer pay for what they promised.

In 2026, four great blocs, the United States, China, Russia and Europe, each show a warning light. They are not the same lights, and none of them signals a collapse tomorrow. But for the first time in a long while, all four are on at once.

This article is long, because the subject demands it. It is built to be understood without any training in economics: we start with the basics, go back to the causes, examine each empire, then look at how a crisis could spread and, above all, at what leaders can still do. Each part can be read on its own.

We separate facts (with figures and sources), estimates from institutions such as the IMF, and our own reading, flagged as such. This is not investment advice.

The essentials

Contents

  1. The basics: understanding debt in ten minutes
  2. How did we get here?
  3. United States: the empire that pays more for its debt than for its army
  4. China: growing old before growing rich
  5. Russia: the war economy that feeds on itself
  6. Europe: rich, but stalled
  7. The risk dashboard
  8. How a crisis could spread
  9. Solutions: what works and what doesn't
  10. Our reading, FAQ and sources

1. The basics: understanding debt in ten minutes

The words to know

Before going further, here are the eight words that come up throughout the article. No need to learn them by heart: come back to this table whenever a term escapes you.

1. The basics: understanding debt in ten minutes
WordWhat it meansSimple example
GDPAll the wealth a country produces in a yearThe country's "revenue"
DeficitWhat the state spends beyond what it takes in over one yearA month in which you spend $2,200 on a $2,000 salary
DebtThe sum of all past deficits that have not been repaidThe total of your outstanding loans
Debt as % of GDPDebt compared with the wealth produced in a year100% = a whole year of the country's output
BondAn IOU the state sells to lenders, which pays interestA "Treasury bond"
Interest rateThe price of borrowed money, in % per yearThe rate on your mortgage
Primary surplusThe budget is positive before paying interest on the debtYou put money aside before repaying your loans
Sovereign ratingThe trust grade given to a state by agencies (S&P, Moody's, Fitch)AAA = the best, then AA, A, BBB…

How a state borrows

A state does not go to the bank like an individual. It sells bonds: securities that say, in essence, "I will give you back 100 in ten years and pay you 3 a year in the meantime". These securities are bought by banks, insurers (who invest your life insurance in them), funds, foreign investors and, at times, the central bank.

How a state borrows, step by step. From the budget gap to the lenders, and back. Revenue: Taxes and social contributions; Spending: Pensions, health, schools, army, interest; Deficit: Spending minus revenue: the gap to fill; Bonds: The Treasury sells IOUs that pay interest; Banks and insurers, Savers and funds, Foreign investors, Central bank (at times); Every year: The state pays interest and repays maturing bonds, usually by borrowing again; If lenders start to doubt, they ask for a higher interest rate on new bonds: that is where the spiral begins. Source: OrigoTech diagram, Nov. 2026.

The crucial point is the last box of the diagram: when a bond matures, the state almost always repays it… by selling a new one. A state therefore never really repays its debt; it "rolls it over". That is why a state's debt is not comparable to a household's: a household must repay before it disappears, a state does not disappear.

But this system has a weakness: it rests entirely on confidence. If lenders start to doubt, they demand a higher rate on each new bond. And since the state constantly replaces its old bonds, the increase ends up affecting all of its debt.

The rule that decides everything: interest rate versus growth

Picture a shopkeeper who borrows at 5% to expand. If sales grow 7% a year, the shopkeeper gets richer: the debt weighs less and less relative to revenue. If sales grow only 2%, the debt weighs a little more every year.

A country works exactly the same way. Two numbers are compared:

If g is larger than r, the debt "melts" on its own relative to the country's wealth. If r exceeds g, it grows on its own, unless the state runs a surplus before paying interest. The chart below shows this with a fictional country that starts with debt equal to 100% of its GDP.

Interest rate versus growth: the rule that decides everything. Simulation: a country starts with debt at 100% of GDP; debt as % of GDP over 20 years. Growth 5%, rate 3%, no surplus: 68%; Growth 3%, rate 5%, no surplus: 147%; Growth 3%, rate 5%, primary surplus ≈ 2% of GDP: 100%; Nominal rates (inflation included). Same starting debt, three different fates: only the gap between the rate and growth, and the budget before interest, change the outcome. Source: OrigoTech calculation: debt(t+1) = debt(t) × (1 + r) / (1 + g) − primary surplus, Nov. 2026.

In all three cases, the country starts from the same point. What changes its fate is neither the size of its starting debt nor the goodwill of its leaders: it is the gap between rate and growth, and the fiscal effort. Keep this small table in mind; it sums up the whole mechanism:

1. The basics: understanding debt in ten minutes
SituationWhat happens to debt (as % of GDP)Effort needed to stabilize it
Growth > rateIt falls on its ownNone; a small deficit is even possible
Growth = rateIt stays stable if the budget balances before interestPrimary balance
Growth < rateIt rises on its ownA primary surplus, all the larger as the debt is heavy

This is the heart of the 2026 problem: during the 2010s, rates were below growth almost everywhere. Since 2022, they have risen.

Why have rates risen?

For ten years after the 2008 crisis, central banks kept rates very low, sometimes negative, to support the economy. Money was almost free and states took advantage. In 2021-2022, inflation returned: the post-Covid rebound, shortages, then an energy price surge after the invasion of Ukraine. To curb it, central banks raised rates, quickly and sharply.

Debt is not refinanced all at once: every month, the state replaces old, cheap loans with new, more expensive ones. So the bill rises slowly, then faster and faster. That is the spiral below.

The debt spiral, in five steps. How a deficit can feed itself when lenders lose confidence. 1. Deficit: The state spends more than it collects; 2. Debt: It borrows the difference: debt grows; 3. Doubt: Lenders ask for a higher reward; 4. Rates: Every new loan costs more; 5. Interest: Interest swells the next deficit; The way out: Growth faster than the interest rate, or a surplus before interest; Rule of thumb: the debt ratio stabilises when growth (g) beats the interest rate (r), or when the budget shows a surplus before interest (primary surplus). Source: OrigoTech diagram, standard public debt dynamics, Nov. 2026.

Three ways to "fall"

When people talk about an economy's "fall", they often mix up three very different scenarios:

1. The basics: understanding debt in ten minutes
Type of crisisHow it plays outHistorical examples
Debt crisisLenders refuse to lend or demand unbearable rates; the state must cut brutally or restructureGreece 2010-2012
Currency crisisThe currency collapses, inflation explodes, savings are wiped outArgentina, several times
Long stagnationNo crash, but years of sluggish growth, weak prices and a debt that keeps getting heavierJapan after 1990

A fourth, shorter form is worth knowing: the confidence shock. In September 2022 in Britain, a budget of unfunded tax cuts sent the pound and gilts tumbling within days, and the prime minister had to leave office a few weeks later. It shows that even a large, rich country is not safe from a warning shot from the markets.

Keeping this distinction in mind is essential: each of our four empires is exposed to a different type of fall.

2. How did we get here?

Today's debts did not fall from the sky. They are the result of a series of shocks, each financed by borrowing, without the calm years being used to repay.

How we got here: 18 years of shocks. The key events behind today's debts. 2008, World: Financial crisis: states borrow to rescue banks and jobs; 2010–12, Europe: Euro debt crisis; Greece restructures its debt in 2012; 2017, US: Unfunded tax cuts (TCJA); 2020, World: Covid: massive public spending; 2020, China: "Three red lines" cap developers' borrowing; 2021, China: Evergrande defaults: the property crisis begins; 2022, Russia: Invasion of Ukraine, sanctions, energy shock in Europe; 2022, World: Inflation returns; central banks raise rates; 2024, China: A Hong Kong court orders Evergrande's liquidation (Jan.); 2024, Russia: Key rate raised to 21% (Oct.); 2025, US: Moody's removes the AAA (May); the OBBBA law adds $3.4T of deficits over 10 years (CBO); 2025, Europe: NATO targets 5% of GDP for defense by 2035 (June); France cut to A+ by Fitch and S&P; 2026, World: Strikes on Iran, oil shock (Feb.); 2026, US: Debt above $40 trillion (Aug.); 10-year yield above 5% (Sept.); Each shock added debt; none was followed by a full repayment. Source: OrigoTech, from the sources listed in the article, Nov. 2026.

The common causes fall into five broad families:

  1. Crises were paid for on credit. In 2008 and again in 2020, states borrowed massively to prevent the collapse of banks and jobs. It was probably the right choice at the time, but the debt stayed.
  2. Free money lulled vigilance. With rates close to zero, borrowing cost almost nothing. Many governments got used to financing everyday spending through debt.
  3. Ageing costs more and more. More retirees and fewer workers: pension and health spending rises mechanically, while revenue grows more slowly.
  4. Growth has slowed. Productivity gains, the ability to produce more with the same amount of work, are weaker than in the 20th century in most rich countries.
  5. The world has become dangerous again. War in Ukraine, war in Iran, tensions with China: military spending is rising everywhere. NATO members committed in June 2025 to devote 5% of their GDP to defense and security by 2035, including 3.5% for core defense (OSW).

The result: worldwide, the IMF estimates that public debt reached 94% of GDP in 2025 and could exceed 100% by 2029, according to the Fiscal Monitor presented in October 2026 at the annual meetings in Bangkok (Pattaya Mail). That would be the highest level since 1948, as the Fund had already written a year earlier (IMF).

Who owes how much? Public debt in 2026. General government gross debt, % of GDP, 2026 (projection). Italy: 137.9%; United States: 126.8%; France: 118.5%; China (standard IMF definition): 104.4%; Euro area (European Commission): 90.2%; Russia: 19.1%; China's "augmented" debt, which adds local government financing vehicles, reaches 135.3% (IMF). The French government projects 119.3% for France. Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor (Oct. 2026); IMF China Article IV (Feb. 2026); European Commission (spring 2026), Nov. 2026.

A debt figure alone does not tell the whole story: Italy owes more than the United States, and Russia owes very little. What matters is the combination of debt, rates, growth and confidence. Let us look at each empire through that lens.

3. United States: the empire that pays more for its debt than for its army

Key figures

3. United States: the empire that pays more for its debt than for its army
IndicatorValueSource
Gross federal debt$40,047 billion (Aug. 18, 2026)Treasury, via Bernama
Public debt, % of GDP126.8% (2026)IMF
Fiscal 2026 deficit$2.0 trillion (7.4 of spending, 5.4 of revenue)AAF, from the Treasury
Interest on the debt, fiscal 2026$1.1 trillion, more than defenseAAF
10-year Treasury yieldabove 5% on Sept. 15, 2026Trading Economics
Growth forecast for 20262.3%IMF
Credit ratingNo AAA left since May 2025Moody's

The facts

Gross federal debt crossed $40 trillion on Aug. 18, 2026, at $40,047 billion, of which $32,266 billion was held by the public, according to Treasury data relayed by Bernama and Xinhua (Bernama). It was about $19,950 billion in January 2017: it has doubled in under ten years (Crypto Briefing via KuCoin). It passed $38 trillion in October 2025, then $39 trillion in March 2026 (WFTV, citing AP). Roughly a trillion dollars more every five months.

United States: $1 trillion more debt every five months. Total federal debt when each milestone was crossed, and time since the previous one. Jan. 2017: ≈ $19,950B; Jan. 2022 (+5 years): $30,000B; Oct. 2025 (+3 years 9 months): $38,000B; Mar. 2026 (+5 months): $39,000B; Aug. 18, 2026 (+5 months): $40,047B; Gross debt; debt held by the public was $32,266B on Aug. 18, 2026. Jan. 2017: about $19,950B. Source: US Treasury (Debt to the Penny), via AP, Bernama/Xinhua and Crypto Briefing, Nov. 2026.

Fiscal year 2026 (October 2025 to September 2026) closed with a $2.0 trillion deficit. Interest on the debt reached $1.1 trillion and exceeded defense spending, according to the American Action Forum, a center-right think tank analyzing the Treasury's final statement (AAF). Over the first nine months of the fiscal year, net interest ($827 billion) was already above defense ($713 billion) and second only to Social Security ($1,244 billion) (Bernama).

United States: interest now costs more than the military. Federal spending, Oct. 2025–June 2026 (first nine months of fiscal 2026), $ billions. Social Security (pensions): $1,244B; Net interest (on the debt): $827B; Defense: $713B; Over the full fiscal year (Oct. 2025–Sept. 2026), interest totaled $1.1 trillion, above defense spending (American Action Forum). Source: US Treasury Monthly Treasury Statement, via Bernama/Xinhua; American Action Forum, Nov. 2026.

The causes

1. Unfunded tax cuts. The federal budget has been in deficit every year since 2001 (Reason). Several major tax reforms cut revenue without matching spending cuts. The latest, the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" signed in July 2025, extends and makes permanent the 2017 tax cuts; according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Congress's nonpartisan budget office, it adds nearly $3.4 trillion to deficits over ten years, excluding interest (Washington Examiner). The White House argues that, combined with the rest of its economic policy, tariffs in particular, it will reduce deficits.

2. Two crises paid for on credit. The 2008 rescue and the 2020-2021 Covid packages added several trillion dollars of debt in a very short time.

3. Ageing. Pensions (Social Security) and health insurance for seniors (Medicare) are the fastest-growing expenses. According to its trustees' 2026 report, the fund that pays retirement benefits will be depleted in late 2032; after that, revenue would cover only about 78% of scheduled benefits, absent reform (CRS, NARSSA).

4. Rising rates. On Sept. 15, 2026, the yield on the 10-year Treasury rose above 5%, its highest since July 2007, as oil surged on the Iran war and fiscal worries grew (Trading Economics). The Federal Reserve raised its rate in September to 3.75–4.00%, then held it on Oct. 28 (investingLive).

5. Political deadlock. Neither major party has a stable majority for a long-term plan, and the debt ceiling regularly triggers standoffs. In May 2025, Moody's removed the United States' last AAA rating, citing debt and interest ratios significantly higher than those of similarly rated countries (Washington Examiner). S&P had done so in 2011 and Fitch in 2023.

A symbol: "Ferguson's Law"

In 2025, historian Niall Ferguson proposed a rule he calls "Ferguson's Law": a great power that spends more on servicing its debt than on defense risks ceasing to be a great power (Hoover Institution). In his view, the United States crossed that line as early as 2024. His examples run from Habsburg Spain to the Ottoman Empire and post-1918 Britain. The rule is disputed: critics note that in several of these cases decline began before the line was crossed, and that 18th-century Britain crossed it without declining (The Pynx). It is a warning sign, not a prophecy.

What still holds

The United States remains the most dynamic economy of the group: the IMF expects 2.3% growth in 2026 and 2027, driven in part by investment in AI (Trading Economics). Above all, it borrows in its own currency, the dollar, which remains the world's main reserve currency. Moody's itself acknowledged that, despite the downgrade, the country retains exceptional strengths: the size and dynamism of its economy and the dollar's role (PBS, citing AP). The Treasury market is the deepest on the planet: buyers are not scarce, they simply ask for more.

Three scenarios for the decade

These scenarios are illustrations built by OrigoTech to help think things through, not numerical forecasts.

3. United States: the empire that pays more for its debt than for its army
ScenarioWhat happensConsequence
Soft landingAI-driven productivity speeds up growth; a budget compromise stabilizes the deficitDebt stabilizes, rates fall
Slow erosion (closest to the current trend)Deficits around 6% of GDP, interest rising steadilyInterest crowds out other spending; room for maneuver melts
Rate shockInvestors demand a large premium; the dollar is challengedSharp rise in global rates, forced cuts

4. China: growing old before growing rich

Key figures

4. China: growing old before growing rich
IndicatorValueSource
Growth, Q3 20264.5% year on yearNational Bureau of Statistics
Property investment (Jan.-Aug. 2026)−19.2% year on yearBBVA Research
Inflation forecast for 20260.8%BBVA Research
Population, end of 20251.405 billion (−3.39 million)Caixin
Official budget debt75.1% of GDP (2026)IMF
"Augmented" debt135.3% of GDP (2026)IMF
Household consumptionabout 40% of GDPIMF

The facts

Chinese growth still looks respectable on paper: 4.5% year on year in the third quarter of 2026 and 4.6% over nine months, within Beijing's target range of 4.5% to 5% (Yeni Şafak, citing the National Bureau of Statistics). Some analysts doubt these figures: Rhodium Group, for example, estimates that real growth in 2025 was below 3% (Rhodium Group). But even taking the official numbers, three cracks are visible.

  1. Property. By the end of August 2026, property investment was still down 19.2% year on year, dragging total investment down 7.2% (BBVA Research).
  2. Prices. BBVA Research expects only 0.8% inflation in 2026. When prices stagnate, debts weigh more, because loans are repaid with money that is worth "more" than when it was borrowed.
  3. Demography. The population fell for the fourth year running in 2025, by 3.39 million, to 1.405 billion. There were 7.92 million births, 17% fewer than in 2024, against 11.31 million deaths (Caixin).
China: fewer babies, more debt. Two slow forces that weigh on growth. 2024: 9.54 M / 10.93 M; 2025: 7.92 M / 11.31 M; 2025: 68.4% / 126.6%; 2026 (proj.): 75.1% / 135.3%; 2030 (proj.): 86.9% / 153.7%; "Augmented" debt adds the borrowing of local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). Population: -3.39 million in 2025, to 1.405 billion. Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (via Caixin, Reuters); IMF, 2025 Article IV (Feb. 2026), Nov. 2026.

The causes

1. A growth model built on concrete. After the 2008 crisis, Beijing revived the economy through investment: roads, housing, factories. Property long drove about a quarter of China's economic activity (Business Standard). Some 70% of Chinese household wealth is in real estate (Business Day): when prices fall, families feel poorer and spend less.

2. The bubble bursts. In August 2020, the government imposed the "three red lines" on developers, borrowing caps meant to deflate the bubble. Evergrande, then one of the world's largest developers, defaulted in 2021 on more than $300 billion of debt, followed by Sunac in 2022 and Country Garden in 2023 (Gulf Times). On Jan. 29, 2024, a Hong Kong court ordered Evergrande's liquidation (CFR).

3. Local governments that lived off land sales. Provinces and cities funded much of their budgets by selling land to developers, and borrowed off budget through financing companies (LGFVs). When property collapsed, that revenue disappeared, but the debts remained. That is why China's public debt varies by a factor of almost two depending on the definition: the IMF counts 75% of GDP in 2026 for official budget debt, but 135% for "augmented" debt, which includes LGFVs, and sees it climbing to nearly 154% by 2030 (IMF, Article IV). At the end of 2024, Beijing launched a 10-trillion-yuan program to swap part of this hidden debt for cheaper official bonds (Caixin).

4. Households that consume too little. Household consumption accounts for only about 40% of China's GDP, against 68% in the United States and 52% in the European Union (Caixin). Families save a lot out of caution, because pensions, health care and unemployment are less well covered than in rich countries. The economy therefore depends on investment and exports, which makes it vulnerable to trade tensions.

5. Demography. The one-child policy, applied from 1980 to 2015, durably reduced the number of young people. Fewer young people means, over time, fewer workers, fewer home buyers and more pensions to fund. Hence the often-used phrase: China risks "growing old before growing rich".

What still holds

China's debt is almost entirely owed to Chinese lenders, in yuan, at banks the state controls. A Greek-style crisis, where foreign creditors cut off funding, is therefore unlikely. China also remains a leading industrial and technological power: in 2025, its trade in high-tech products grew 11.4% (IMF, Finance & Development). The risk looks more like Japan after 1990: not a crash, but years of sluggish growth and weak prices.

Three scenarios for the decade

4. China: growing old before growing rich
ScenarioWhat happensConsequence
Successful rebalancingStronger safety net, households spending more, local debts cleaned upSlower but sturdier growth
Japanification (closest to the current trend)Flat prices, property that doesn't recover, rising public debtA decade of weak growth
Financial accidentChain defaults by local governments or regional banksGlobal shock through trade and commodities

5. Russia: the war economy that feeds on itself

Key figures

5. Russia: the war economy that feeds on itself
IndicatorValueSource
Growth 2024 → 2025 → 2026 (forecast)4.3% → 0.6% → 0.9%The Moscow Times, IMF
Key rate14% (after a 21% peak)Bank of Russia
National Wealth Fund (liquid assets)$113.5B early 2022 → about $52B Jan. 2026United24, citing Gazprombank
Defense and securityabout 38% of the 2026 federal budgetThe Moscow Times
VAT22% since January 2026 (from 20%)The Moscow Times
Public debtabout 19% of GDPIMF

The facts

Driven by military spending, Russian growth reached 4.3% in 2024 before falling to 0.6% in 2025 (The Moscow Times). For 2026, the IMF expects 0.9% (Interfax) and the Bank of Russia between 0% and 1% (Interfax).

Two warning lights are red.

Russia: the cushion is melting, credit stays expensive. The war economy's two warning lights. Early 2022 (before the invasion): $113.5B; Jan. 2026: ≈ $52B; Oct. 2024–June 2025: 21%; Dec. 2025: 16%; Feb. 2026: 15.5%; Apr. 2026: 14.5%; July–Oct. 2026: 14%; The fund has sold about 60% of its gold since 2022. The central bank expects 6–7% inflation in 2026, for a 4% target. Source: The Moscow Times; Gazprombank (via United24); Bank of Russia; Interfax; The Star, Nov. 2026.

The causes

1. An economy entirely geared to war. A war economy is like an athlete on adrenaline: it produces a lot in the short term (tanks, shells, high wages for soldiers and arms workers), but these goods create no future wealth, and the effort exhausts the rest of the body. In 2026, defense and domestic security make up about 38% of the federal budget, only slightly less than the 40% of the previous two years (The Moscow Times). The Carnegie think tank estimates this spending remains around 8% of GDP (Carnegie).

2. Dependence on oil and gas. Hydrocarbons remain the main source of foreign currency. Western sanctions and the price cap reduce this revenue: the share of oil and gas in federal revenue was set to fall to 22% in 2026, according to the Bank of Finland (BOFIT). The US-Israeli strikes on Iran at the end of February 2026 sent oil soaring and brought Moscow extra revenue (The Moscow Times). But the effect faded quickly: in August, a barrel of Russian Urals was worth just over $59, against nearly $95 in the spring (NV, citing Bloomberg).

3. Rising taxes. To fill the gap, Moscow raised VAT from 20% to 22% on Jan. 1, 2026 (The Moscow Times). From January to April 2026, the budget deficit had already exceeded that of the whole of 2025 (Jamestown Foundation).

4. Financial isolation. Cut off from Western markets, Russia can only borrow at home, mostly from state banks, and the cost of that debt is climbing. Debt service is set to take 8.8% of federal spending in 2026, twice the 2021 share (Reuters via Y94).

What still holds

The paradox: Russia has little debt, about 19% of GDP according to the IMF (TASS). It is not threatened by a classic debt crisis. Its danger is not a sudden fall but wear and tear: a civilian economy withering while the war effort absorbs resources.

Three scenarios for the decade

5. Russia: the war economy that feeds on itself
ScenarioWhat happensConsequence
De-escalationThe cost of the war falls, some sanctions are liftedRates can fall, civilian investment picks up
Attrition (closest to the current trend)Long war, average oil prices, rising taxesGrowth near zero, reserves exhausted
Oil price collapseBarrel price durably lowExploding deficit, inflation, social cuts

6. Europe: rich, but stalled

Key figures

6. Europe: rich, but stalled
IndicatorValueSource
Euro area growth, 20261.1%IMF
Euro area public debt90.2% of GDPEurogroup
France's debt (end of June 2026)119.0% of GDP, €3,595.5 billionInsee
Italy's debt137.9% of GDPIMF
Germany's growth, 20261.3%Federal Government
France's ratingA+ (Fitch, S&P), Aa3 (Moody's)Agencies, via iFRAP

The facts

The euro area is expected to grow 1.1% in 2026 according to the IMF, held back by energy costs and weak consumer confidence (Trading Economics). Its public debt is set to reach 90.2% of GDP and its deficit 3.3%, pushed up in particular by higher defense spending (Lovguiden, citing the Eurogroup). The picture varies widely from one country to another.

The French case. At the end of June 2026, public debt reached €3,595.5 billion, or 119.0% of GDP (Insee). The government projects 119.3% at the end of 2026 and 121.7% at the end of 2027, with a deficit of 5.4% then 5.0% of GDP (La Presse). That would be the highest level since the series began in 1978 (Euronews). For the central state alone, the interest bill would rise from €62.6 billion to €72.9 billion in 2027, according to Agence France Trésor (La Gazette France). For comparison, the national education budget is about €64.5 billion in 2026 (Major Prépa). The 2027 budget plans €54 billion of savings and adjustments (Euronews), a few months before the presidential election.

France: debt that keeps climbing. Public debt (Maastricht definition), % of GDP, and the state's interest bill. End of 2025: 115.7%; End of March 2026: 117.5%; End of June 2026: 119.0%; End of 2026 (Forecast): 119.3%; End of 2027 (Forecast): 121.7%; 2026 (Estimate): €62.6bn; 2027 (Forecast): €72.9bn; Forecasts: government (Sept. 2026). Interest bill: central state only, per Agence France Trésor; 2027 is a forecast. Source: Insee; French Ministry of the Economy (via AFP, Euronews); Agence France Trésor (via La Gazette France), Nov. 2026.

The causes

1. Productivity falling behind. The report Mario Draghi delivered to the European Commission in September 2024 found that Europe had fallen behind the United States in the technologies of the future and estimated that an extra €750–800 billion of investment a year would be needed to close the gap. Less productivity means less growth, and therefore a weaker "g" in our rate-versus-growth rule.

2. The energy shock. After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Europe lost most of its cheap Russian gas. Energy prices soared, then stayed higher than in the United States, which weighs on industry. The Iran war added a new shock in 2026.

3. Chinese competition. EU imports from China reached €558.8 billion in 2025, 54% above 2019, while exports to China fell (IMF, Finance & Development). The German car industry, long a champion in China, is the first to suffer.

4. Ageing and a costly social model. Europe is ageing faster than the United States. Pension and health spending is higher there, funded by fewer workers.

5. New defense spending. NATO's commitment to raise the effort to 5% of GDP by 2035 means, for many European countries, a considerable increase at a time when their budgets are already stretched.

6. The French case: fifty years of deficits and political instability. France has not presented a balanced central government budget since 1974. Since the dissolution of the National Assembly in 2024, no stable majority has emerged, which makes any multi-year plan difficult. The agencies drew the consequences: Fitch cut France to A+ in September 2025 and S&P in October 2025, while Moody's keeps it at Aa3 with a negative outlook (iFRAP).

What still holds

Europe remains one of the richest regions in the world, with abundant private savings, and France still borrows without difficulty, just at a higher price. Moody's also noted that France's 2025 deficit, at 5.1% of GDP, came in better than expected (La Gazette France). European institutions also showed, in 2012 and again in 2020, that they can act in a crisis.

Three scenarios for the decade

6. Europe: rich, but stalled
ScenarioWhat happensConsequence
RevivalMassive investment, a deeper single market, budgets gradually repairedGrowth picks up, debt stabilizes
Slow decline (closest to the current trend)Growth around 1%, defense spending financed on creditInterest costs crowd out schools and research
Confidence crisisA large indebted country (France, Italy) sees its rates soarThe ECB must step in, with conditions

7. The risk dashboard

To compare the four empires at a glance, here are two tools: a table of figures, then a grid that scores each weakness from 1 to 5.

7. The risk dashboard
United StatesChinaRussiaEurope
Public debt (2026)126.8% of GDP104.4% (135.3% "augmented")≈ 19%90.2% (euro area)
2026 growth (IMF)2.3%4.5%0.9%1.1% (euro area)
Main illnessDeficits and interestProperty, prices, demographyWar and oil dependenceWeak growth, ageing
What protects itThe dollarDebt owed at homeLow debtWealth, savings, institutions
Most likely type of fallA "rate shock"Japan-style stagnationAttritionA confidence crisis in one country
Risk dashboard: where each empire is weakest. Score from 1 (low risk) to 5 (high risk), OrigoTech assessment based on the article's figures. United States: Debt level 4, Interest cost 5, Weak growth 2, Ageing 2, External shocks 2, Budget deadlock 4; China: Debt level 4, Interest cost 2, Weak growth 3, Ageing 5, External shocks 3, Budget deadlock 2; Russia: Debt level 1, Interest cost 3, Weak growth 4, Ageing 4, External shocks 5, Budget deadlock 2; Europe: Debt level 3, Interest cost 3, Weak growth 4, Ageing 4, External shocks 4, Budget deadlock 4; This grid is a judgment, not a measurement: it summarises the figures and causes discussed in the article. Europe is an average; France would score higher on debt and deadlock. Source: OrigoTech assessment, Nov. 2026.

The common thread is expensive money. For ten years, low rates let everyone borrow painlessly. Since 2022, every government has been discovering the real price of its promises: pensions, health care, armies, subsidies. And in 2026, the Iran war added an oil shock: the IMF expects the average oil price to rise 41.3% in 2026 (Australian Industry Group, citing the IMF).

8. How a crisis could spread

These four economies are not islands. They trade with one another, borrow on the same markets and depend on the same raw materials. A crisis in one would pass to the others through several channels.

How a crisis could spread from one empire to another. The main transmission channels, numbered. 1. US yields rise: money becomes dearer everywhere, since the world prices its loans off Treasuries; 2. Higher rates hit the most indebted European states first (France, Italy); 3. A slowing China buys fewer European machines and cars and exports more cheap goods to Europe; 4. Russia weighs on Europe through energy, sanctions and defense spending; 5. Trade tensions between the US and China weigh on both economies; 6. An oil shock raises inflation, hence rates, for importers; it helps Russia only while prices stay high; The arrows show the main direction of each effect; in reality, most work both ways. Source: OrigoTech diagram, Nov. 2026.

The most powerful channel is the first: US rates. The whole world prices its borrowing by looking at the price of US debt. When investors demand more to lend to Washington, they also demand more to lend to Paris, Rome or São Paulo. That is why US debt is not just an American problem.

The second point to remember concerns Europe: it sits at the crossroads of almost every channel. It is exposed to US rates, Chinese competition, the Russian threat and oil shocks. That is both its weakness and a reason to act quickly.

9. Solutions: what works and what doesn't

The four possible exits

History offers four ways out of a debt that has grown too heavy. None is painless.

9. Solutions: what works and what doesn't
ExitHow it worksAdvantageCostExample
GrowthGDP grows faster than the debtThe least painfulSlow; cannot be decreedBritain after 1945
Fiscal effortSpend less or tax moreEffective and credibleUnpopular; may slow the economyCanada after 1995
InflationRising prices shrink the real value of the debtDiscreetImpoverishes savers and workers, pushes rates upThe 1970s
Default or restructuringNot everything is repaidImmediate reliefConfidence ruined for a long timeGreece 2012

What history teaches us

The good news is that heavily indebted countries have managed to turn things around.

It has been done before: two countries that cut their debt. Debt as % of GDP, before and after. United Kingdom (net debt; growth, low rates, surpluses): 252% (1946/47) → 62.1% (1971/72); Canada (federal debt; 1995 budget, mostly spending cuts): 75% (1995) → 37% (2008); United Kingdom: 1946/47 then 1971/72. Canada: 1995 then 2008. In both cases, growth above the interest rate did much of the work. Source: Economics Observatory (N. Crafts); Finance Canada, Fiscal Reference Tables (via SAGE Canada), Nov. 2026.

Britain after 1945. Its net debt peaked at 252% of GDP in 1946/47; 25 years later, in 1971/72, it was only 62.1% (Economics Observatory). How? According to economist Nicholas Crafts, about 60% of the fall came from growth above the real interest rate, and 40% from budget surpluses before interest (Economics Observatory). Rates were also held down by "financial repression" (capital controls, rules forcing banks to hold government debt) and, later, by inflation (OBR). These tools would be hard to reproduce today, with open markets and independent central banks. So it is not a model to copy: those forced low rates and that inflation are no longer possible today.

Canada after 1995. In the early 1990s, Canada was one of the most indebted G7 countries, and interest absorbed 38 cents of every dollar of federal revenue (Policy Options). The 1995 budget presented by Finance Minister Paul Martin launched a consolidation of about 5% of GDP over three years, mostly through spending cuts (Policy Options). The result: a surplus by 1997-98 and federal debt down from about 75% of GDP in 1995 to 37% in 2008 (SAGE Canada, citing Finance Canada). Strong growth, helped by the North American Free Trade Agreement, also played a part.

Both examples teach the same lesson: success combines a credible and sufficiently ambitious plan, growth above the interest rate and broad public agreement on the need to act. In Canada, the public debate had created a consensus that "something significant had to be done", even without agreement on the details (Policy Options).

Examples closer to today

One objection comes up often, and it is fair: post-war Britain looks nothing like the world of 2026. No government can force banks to lend to it cheaply anymore. The next three examples are more useful, because they happened in open economies, with independent central banks, ageing populations and modest growth.

Sweden in the 1990s. After a banking crisis, GDP fell three years in a row, the deficit reached 11% of GDP in 1993 and gross debt rose from 41% of GDP in 1990 to 73% in 1996 (VoxEU). The country adopted a multi-year plan of spending cuts and tax increases, then lasting rules: a surplus target over the whole business cycle and a spending ceiling set three years in advance. Result: a surplus of 3.6% of GDP in 2000 and debt brought down to 37% in 2011 (VoxEU). The limit: the krona had fallen sharply after Sweden dropped its fixed exchange rate, which revived exports. A eurozone country cannot devalue, and for that reason the economist Martin Flodén considers the Swedish experience hard to transpose to today's indebted countries (CEPR).

Germany between 2010 and 2019. Its debt rose to 82% of GDP in 2010, after the financial crisis, then fell back to 60% in 2019 (ifo). The "debt brake" written into the constitution in 2009 and the "black zero" policy produced budget surpluses. But Germany also benefited from exceptional conditions: record employment, rising tax revenue and interest rates close to zero. A Forum New Economy study attributes most of the decline to GDP growth rather than to repayment (Forum New Economy). The limit: those ultra-low rates are gone, and critics blame that decade for public underinvestment that the country is now trying to make up for by loosening the same brake.

Portugal between 2015 and 2025. This is probably the most telling example for today's Europe: a eurozone country, with no currency of its own, an ageing population and growth of about 2% a year. Fresh out of an international bailout, it had debt of about 132% of GDP in 2015 (Essential Business). By the end of 2025 it had fallen to 89.7%, its lowest level since 2009, with budget surpluses of 0.6% of GDP in 2024 and 0.7% in 2025 (ECO News). The recipe: surpluses before interest year after year, and nominal growth (inflation included) above the average rate paid on the debt, as the Bank of Portugal already noted in 2018 (Banco de Portugal). The limit: the road went through years of very harsh austerity, and Portugal's debt is still among the highest in the eurozone.

9. Solutions: what works and what doesn't
ExampleDebt at the start → at the endWhat helpedWhat can't be repeated everywhere
Sweden, 1996 → 201173% → 37% of GDPMulti-year plan, political consensus, strict fiscal rulesA sharp fall in the currency, impossible in the eurozone
Germany, 2010 → 201982% → 60% of GDPDebt brake, surpluses, record employmentNear-zero interest rates; public investment sacrificed
Portugal, 2015 → 2025about 132% → 89.7% of GDPSurpluses before interest, growth above the rate on the debtYears of very harsh austerity at the start

None of these countries needed post-war growth. All of them needed the same thing: a credible rule, kept for more than ten years, across changes of government. That is exactly what is hardest to achieve today in the United States and in France, where no stable majority is emerging. For Russia, none of these examples applies as long as the war goes on.

The levers, empire by empire

Choosing among these levers is a matter for democratic debate: we set out the most often cited options and their costs, not a program.

United States

9. Solutions: what works and what doesn't
LeverExpected effectCost or risk
A credible ten-year budget planReassures markets, lowers the risk premiumRequires a compromise between the two parties
Social Security reform before 2032Avoids an automatic cut of about 22% in benefitsRaise contributions, the retirement age, or adjust benefits
More revenue (taxes)Cuts the deficit quicklyBacked mostly by Democrats; opponents say it would slow activity
Less spendingCuts the deficit durablyBacked mostly by Republicans; hits popular programs
An independent central bankMarkets believe inflation will not be used to erase the debtSometimes higher rates in the short run
Betting on AI productivityRaises "g"Uncertain, and not yet visible in the debt figures

China

9. Solutions: what works and what doesn't
LeverExpected effectCost or risk
Strengthen pensions, health and unemployment insuranceHouseholds save less and spend moreCosts public money in the short run
Reform the residence permit (hukou)Gives migrant workers access to city public servicesLocal resistance, cost for cities
Finish cleaning up local debtsDefuses a time bombLosses to share between the state, banks and creditors
Let insolvent developers fail in an orderly wayThe market finds a price floorShort-term hit to confidence
End the property crisisRevives household confidenceAbout 5% of GDP over three years, according to the IMF

The IMF estimates that its recommendations as a whole could raise consumption by about 4 percentage points of GDP over five years (IMF), and that ending the property crisis would cost about 5% of GDP (Business Day).

Russia

9. Solutions: what works and what doesn't
LeverExpected effectCost or risk
Reduce the cost of the warFrees the budget, allows lower ratesA political decision before an economic one
Raise taxes furtherFills the deficitHolds back consumption and investment
Draw on reservesBuys timeReserves are already under half their pre-war level
Diversify beyond hydrocarbonsReduces oil dependenceVery hard under sanctions and with 14% rates

As long as the war absorbs such a large share of the budget, the central bank has to keep rates high and the civilian economy withers. The only variable that truly changes the equation is the cost of the war.

Europe (and France)

9. Solutions: what works and what doesn't
LeverExpected effectCost or risk
Invest massively (Draghi report)Closes the productivity gap, raises "g"€750–800 billion a year to finance
Unify capital marketsEuropean savings finance European companiesNational resistance, a long technical reform
Deepen the single market (energy, digital, defense)Economies of scale, bigger companiesSharing sovereignty
Common defenseStops 27 countries buying separately and at higher costHard political agreement
France: a gradual but steady deficit-reduction pathStabilizes debt, regains the agencies' trustSavings or taxes to choose, in a parliament without a majority
More people working, for longerMore revenue, less spendingA politically explosive subject (pensions)

False good ideas

Some solutions often come up in the debate but do not stand up to scrutiny.

Our reading: why "fall" may be the wrong word

The word "fall" conjures up Rome overrun in a single night. Economic reality looks more like Hemingway's line about going bankrupt: it happens "gradually, then suddenly". Gradually, because debts grow quietly for years. Suddenly, because confidence can tip in a few weeks, as in Britain in September 2022.

None of these four blocs is doomed. Each still has considerable strengths: the dollar for the United States, savings and industry for China, low debt for Russia, wealth and institutions for Europe. And history shows that far more indebted countries have pulled through.

But none can count on free money any longer to put off hard choices. The real danger is not the debt itself: it is letting interest payments decide, in place of leaders, what the state can still afford. When a country pays more for its past than for its future, it has begun to decline, even if no one has noticed yet. So the question is not whether these empires will fall, but whether they will act while they still have a choice of means.

FAQ

Can the United States go bankrupt?

Not in the way a company can: it borrows in dollars, a currency it issues. The realistic risk is different: durably higher rates, stronger inflation or a loss of confidence in the dollar, which would reduce Washington's room for maneuver and make credit more expensive worldwide.

Why is Russia fragile despite its low debt?

Because its weakness is not the amount of debt but the financing: it depends on oil, its reserves are melting, and it can only borrow on its domestic market, at high rates.

Could France face a Greek-style crisis?

The case is different: France is much larger, its debt is in high demand and it benefits from the European Central Bank's tools. But its interest bill is rising fast and eating into its margins; Fitch and S&P already cut it to A+ in 2025 (iFRAP).

What is China's "augmented" debt?

It is an IMF measure that adds the borrowing of financing companies created by local governments to official debt. It gives a fuller picture of what the Chinese state will, in practice, have to take on.

Why does Italy, more indebted than France, worry markets less today?

Because its deficit is smaller (around 2.9% of GDP against more than 5% in France): its debt grows more slowly. Markets watch the trajectory as much as the level.

What does all this change for me?

In practice, three things. Higher interest rates on mortgages and consumer loans, because they follow government rates. Pressure on public services and benefits, because every euro or dollar of interest is one that does not fund schools or hospitals. And, eventually, debates on taxes and the retirement age.

Do you need post-war growth to reduce debt?

No. Portugal brought its debt down from about 132% to 89.7% of GDP between 2015 and 2025 with growth of about 2% a year (ECO News). What matters is that growth, inflation included, stays above the rate paid on the debt, and that the state runs a surplus before interest for several years.

Is a global crisis imminent?

Nothing suggests so in the short term: states continue to borrow without difficulty. The risk is rather a slow erosion, punctuated by occasional shocks (like the rise in US rates in September 2026). It is precisely during this calm period that acting costs the least.

Method and limits

Figures consulted between Nov. 7 and 9, 2026. Data for 2026 and beyond are mostly forecasts (IMF, governments, central banks) that will be revised. Definitions of debt differ between sources: we state which one is used. Several figures come from media outlets citing official data; we attribute them each time. The scenarios, the risk grid and the rate-versus-growth simulation are teaching tools built by OrigoTech, not forecasts. "Our reading" is an interpretation, not a fact. This article is not investment advice.

Sources

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